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MODERN TENDENCIES IN HABITUAL
CRIMINAL LEGISLATION
J. A. RoYcE MCCUAIG*
My object all sublime
I shall achieve in time
To let the punishment fit the crime,
The punishment fit the crime;
And make each prisoner pent
Unwillingly represent
A source of innocent merriment,
Of innocent merriment !-
-The Mikado.
What is more compelling than well-directed satire? The songs
from the delightful and familiar Gilbert and Sullivan operas satirized
conditions in England when vast changes were being sought. It
is interesting to observe the accuracy with which the thing criti-
cized is illustrated. A sounder doctrine than fitting punishment
to crime cannot be found in jurisprudence. Yet at no time in
any country have punishment and crime so been harmonized as to
achieve the really sublime object of any true system of law and order.
I p~urpose in these pages to speak about the abuse of legislative
authority in criminal matters from the standpoint of jurisprudence;
and I have selected as my text the maxim, "Let the punishment
fit the crime."
In the modernistic struggle to keep up with the evolutionary
advances of science, it sometimes requires courage to profess a pre-
dilection for "old-fashioned" principles. In the science of law, how-
ever, we cannot turn away lightly from the postulates of the early
law-givers. For after all, law is the only possible sanction for social
.well-being. In writing of the reconstruction of Russia, Trotsky said:
"A critical examination of custom and habit has become a neces-
sity, so that life, which is conservative by its traditions of a thousand
years, shall not lag behind the progressive possibilities which are
opening up."' The behaviour of the individual does not change.
It is only the stimuli from which his reactions spring that change.
So that while we are living in an age which knows of radio-activity,
aeronautics, and insulin, we are ourselves no different in the funda-
mentals from our forbears. Law, therefore, which is an emanation
of our cultural development, cannot be wilfully maladjusted in
principle to give expression to every untried proposal for so-called
advancement.
*Barrister-at-Law, Toronto, Ontario.
'TROTSKY, PROBLEMS OF LIFE (1924) 32.
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It is, perhaps, a moot question in jurisprudence whether the history
of law is an aid to the determination of the scope of modem prin-
ciples of law.2 I respectfully follow the reasoning of Chief Judge
Cardozo, who has dealt with the point in his work on The Nature of
the Judicial Process, illustrating the importance of a knowledge of the
historical, traditional, and sociological phases of law in the equipment
of the judge.
An effusive worship of tradition is the mark of the dilettante.
But an utter disregard for it on the part of a law maker is inexcusable.
The jurist, in the true sense, must be reactionary, so far as the reten-
tion of principles of law is concerned; while in their adaptation to
modern conditions, it is not only permissible but obligatory on him
to be progressive. In other words, there must be due recognition of
the vitality of the ancient dogma from which our present system has
emerged, such as is implied in the phrase "theliberty of the subject."
If the liberty of the subject be in jeopardy, he may invoke the sov-
ereignty of the state for extraordinary relief. In theory of law, all
barriers fall away before the majesty of that invocation. And why?
Because, the liberty of the subject is a very real thing, a wrongful
deprivation of which-whether temporary or absolute-can never
2HOLLAND, ELEMENTS OF JURISPRUDENCE (13th ed. 1924) 378-380: "Perhaps
the most important of the functions of the State is that which it discharges as
the guardian of order; preventing and punishing all injuries to itself, and all
disobedience to the rules which it has laid down for the common welfare. In
defining the orbit of its rights in this respect, the State usually proceeds by an
enumeration of the acts which infringe upon them, coupled with an intimation
of the penalty to which any one committing such acts will be liable. The branch
of law which contains the rules upon this subject is accordingly described as
'Criminal law,' 'Droit penal,' 'Strafrecht.'
"It is comparatively modem. The early tendency was to punish offences
against the sovereign power by an exceptional executive or legislative act, and to
treat offences against individuals, even when, like theft and homicide, they were a
serious menace to the general welfare, as merely civil injuries to be compensated
for by damages. The law of Rome continued to the last to treat as civil delicts
acts which would now be regarded exclusively as crimes, although, by a long
course of unsystematic legislation, it had also attached penal consequences to
some of them. The merely practical and disorderly character of the criminal
law which is preserved, for instance, in the ninth books of the Codes of Theodosius
and Justinian is readily explicable. The prerogative of punishment, exercised
in early times by the king and the 'comitia centuriata' and in later times shared
by the senate, was usually delegated in each case to a magistrate or body of
commissioners. The series of statutes by which standing delegacies, 'quaestiones
perpetuae,' were instituted for the trial of offencesof particular kinds, whenever
they might be committed, commences with the lex Calpurnia, B.C. i49, and was
continued till a number of courses of conduct had been from time to time branded
as criminal. The legislation of the emperors, though it superseded the 'quaes-
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be repaired. You can be compensated for property of which you
are deprived, but no power on earth can give you back the day during
which you have been denied the right to live as a free man. This
is not idle cant, for the liberty of the subject is the sine qua non of our
English jurisprudence. Let us consider, then, what is happening to
it in these days of enlightenment.
My subject is one of those which are forever troubling the con-
sciences of the upholders of the old jurisprudence. At the words
"modem tendencies" they hold up their hands in horror. And have
they not cause?
The term "habitual criminal" is not new to English law, and it
has more recently found its way into that stream of legislation called
the Prevention of Crimes Acts. The doctrine of habitual criminality
proceeds on the theory that a person sui juris may, by a repetition
of offences against the state, render himself amenable to a statutory
prohibition whereby he is prevented from giving further expression
to his susceptibility of crime. It will be noted that the application of
the statute turns on the finding by a court of record that the accused
is an habitual criminal. Habitual criminality is, therefore, regarded
as an offense per se known to the law.
The indicia by which habitual criminality is to be determined are
fixed by law. If a man exhibit a tendency over a period of years
to commit offences of a similar character every time the opportunity
presents itself, it is not unreasonable to say of that individual that
tiones' by the simpler procedure of the 'iudicia extraordinaria,' followed the lines
of the old criminal statutes, and produced a body of rules large indeed but form-
less, -and owing hardly anything to the great men whose wisdom had interpene-
trated every doctrine of private law. The Teutonic view of even violent wrongs
resembled the early Roman, in regarding them as concerning almost exclusively
the person injured, to whom therefore atonement was to be made by way of
damages, 'compositio.' When the idea began to be clearly grasped by the Ger-
mans that wrong-doing might injure not merely the individual, but also the
State itself, they found little assistance towards formulating it in the legal system
to which they were most accustomed to turn for guidance. The criminal law of
Rome, deeply tinged as it was with national idiosyncrasies, had never been pre-
pared by juristic exposition for more general usefulness. Original legislation
was therefore necessary, and the first essay was made in the 'Constitutio Crimi-
nalis Carolina,' of the Emperor Charles V. This attempt to provide a criminal
law for the whole Empire lost much of its importance from the compilation of
national codes for Bavaria, Austria, and many other German States during the
latter half of the eighteenth century, but was the forerunner of the penal code
for all Germany, 'Strafgesetzbuch fOl das Deutsche Reich,' which cameinto opera-
tion in 1872. Of the other great criminal codes now in force, the 'Code Pnal'
became law for France in 18io, and has been imitated by the Latin races of the
continent; while the penal code for British India which was drafted in 1834 by
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he has a susceptibility in that direction. Perhaps the nature of the
crime which he is repeatedly committing suggests the wisdom of
placing him in a psychiatric ward for observation. If, however, our
recidivist, by all present known tests of insanity,3 turns out to be
sane according to the law,4 then the duty arises of dealing with him
as an habitual criminal, not in any mere statutory sense, but from
a medico-legal standpoint. He is of a type requiring special treat-
ment-recognition of which by law is a stage not as yet attained.
THE NEw YORK HABITUAL CRIMINAL LEGISLATION
The man, therefore, that such legislation as the Baumes Laws of
the State of New York is chiefly concerned with is the man whom the
law regards, not as insane, not as belonging to a new type of
habitual criminals, but as one who, by mathematical calculation of
his previous offences, has rendered himself open to a sentence of
imprisonment for the term of his natural life.
Throughout the United States, wherever the proposal to adopt
similar legislation was made, the commentaries on the subject
eulogized the wave of crime prevention that was sweeping the
country. While acknowledging the severity of the Baumes Laws,
Lord Macaulay was promulgated in 1860. In the meantime the whole theory of
punishment and of the classification of offences has been thoroughly discussed
by such men as Beccaria, Bentham, Feuerbach, Mittermaier, and Sir J. F.
Stephen; and the criminal branch of public law may now be said to be divided
upon recognised principles, and to possess a terminology, though a somewhat
loose one, of its own2'
3 EAST, AN INTRODUCTION TO FORENSIC'PSYCHIATRY IN THE CRIMINAL COURTS
(1927) 155: "The association of crime with this form of insanity [moral insanity]
is infrequent in prison practice, and this is probably because the form of insanity
itself is uncommon. Indeed, some modern writers make no mention of it what-
ever, or do not distinguish between moral insanity and moral imbecility. Other
authorities, however, have recognized for many years a disease of the mind
which shows itself by unmoral acts distinguishable from criminal conduct, but
perhaps with difficulty, and occurring in persons who previously possessed ethical
perception, who exercised control over their desires and who observed their social
obligations."
4EAST, op. cit. supra note 3, at 159: "At times the medical man may only suspect
that an accused person is suffering from this form of insanity [moral insanity].
On other occasions he may go further and consider that the subject is so suffering,
but he may lack sufficient evidence to enable him to certify the individual as
insane. He will usually be unable to say that the accused is insane according to
law, for the offenders know what they are doing, and usually that their criminal
acts are wrong and punishable by the law. It will rest with the judicial authority,
or the jury, whether or no the accused be dealt with as insane at court. This is,
of course, of no concern to the witness, who is not responsible, as they are, for the
protection of the public."
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they pointed to their efficacy in reducing crime. All this information
was very interesting and unquestionably assisted many legislatures
in deciding the wisdom of following the lead of New York. The error
which crept in was, I submit, a failure to realize the cause behind
the cause. The ascendency of crime was due to certain conditions,5
which were not alone attributable to the wrongdoer. The great
cancer in criminal administration-delay--had worked its evil: delay
in bringing the accused to trial; delay in empanelling a jury; delay
in permitting a dozen abortive motions to be argued to prolong the
proceedings (as occurred in the tragic Sacco and Vanzetti trialsa);
and delay or uncertainty in the carrying out of the sentence. The
conditions became alarming and the fact that crime was on the in-
crease and was getting out of bounds so filled the minds of those
charged with the protection of the public that they resolved to take
drastic measures to stem the tide. Instead of finding the causes or
contributing causes, however, they selected a palliative-and that
palliative is to be found in the provisions of the Baumes Laws.
With these observations by way of preliminary, I turn now to the
text of these laws. The essential elements appear in sections 1942 and
1943:
A person who, after having been three times convicted within
this state, of felonies or attempts to commit felonies, or under
the law of any other state, goyermnent or country, of crimes
which if committed within this state would be felonious, commits
a felony within this state, shall be sentenced upon conviction of
such fourth, or subsequent, offense to imprisonment in a state
prison for the term of his natural life.
If at any time, either after sentence or conviction, it shall
appear that a person convicted of a felony has previously been
convicted of crimes as set forth either in section nineteen hun-
dred and forty-one or nineteen hundred and forty-two, it shall
be the duty of the district attorney of the county in which such
'See Merrill, J., in People v. Gowasky, 219 App. Div. 19, 25, 219 N. Y. Supp.
373, 38o (Ist Dept. 1926): "..... Present-day laxity in the enforcement of our
criminal and penal laws is, in our opinion, largely responsible for the wave of
crime which seems to have engulfed the country. It was to check the increasing
prevalence of crime that the so called 'Baumes Laws' were enacted by the Legis-
lature in 1926. While these statutes may not be in all respects perfect, we regard
them as within the police power of the Legislature and deserving of a fair trial
where their efficacy may be proved or disproved. Unquestionably defects
may be discovered in the new statutes which must be remedied by legislative
action.... We call attention to such apparent inconsistency in the provisions
of the Penal Law, not that it has any bearing upon the questions presented upon
this appeal, but that remedial action may be taken by the Legislature in
reference thereto."
aED.-Book Review (1929) 15 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY 155.
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conviction was had to file an information accusing the said per-
son of such previous convictions. Whereupon, the court in
which such conviction was had shall cause the said person,
whether confined in prison or otherwise, to be brought before it
and shall inform him of the allegations contained in such infor-
mation and of his right to be tried as to the truth thereof ac-
cording to law, and shall require such offender to say whether
he is the same person as charged in such information or not.
The full text of the statute appears below.6
Although there have been a number of decisions by way of inter-
pretation, there has been no statutory amendment altering the
language of the sections. So that by reason of a disparity in case
law on the subject, we are left virtually to the text itself for a deter-
mination of its scope and constitutionality. Without the aid of
explicit judicial interpretation, it is difficult accurately to express an
opinion regarding its entire meaning and operation. It is even more
difficult to go behind the statute to enquire into the full intention
of the legislature. Added to these difficulties is the personal one of
the writer that he is not trained in the jurisprudence of the United
States. It is, therefore, with the utmost deference to abler commenta-
tors and particularly those learned in the law of the United States,
6N. Y. Laws 1926, c. 457:
Section i. Section nineteen hundred and forty-one of the penal law, as
last amended by chapter five hundred and seventy-one of the laws of nine-
teen hundred and twenty, is hereby amended to read as follows:
§ 1941. Punishment for second offence of felony. A person, who after
having been convicted within the state, of a felony, or an attempt to commit
a felony, or, under the laws of any other state, government, or country, of a
crime which, if committed within this state, would be a felony, commits
any felony, within this State, is punishable upon conviction of such second
offense, as follows:
If the subsequent felony is such that, upon the first conviction, the
offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his
natural life, then such person must be sentenced to imprisonment for a term
not less than the longest term, nor more than twice the longest term, pre-
scribed upon a first conviction.
§ 2. Section nineteen hundred and forty-two of the penal law is hereby
amended to read as follows:
§ 1942. Punishment for fourth conviction of felony. A person who, after
having been three times convicted within this state, of felonies or attempts
to commit felonies, or under the law of any other state, government or
country, of crimes which if committed within this state would be felonies
commits a felony within this state, shall be sentenced upon conviction of
such fourth, or subsequent, offense to imprisonment in a state prison for
the term of his natural life. A person to be punishable under this and the
preceding section need not have been indicted and convicted as a previous
offender in order to receive the increased punishment therein provided,
but may be proceeded against as provided in the following section:§ 3. The said penal law is hereby further amended by adding thereto a
new section to be known as section nineteen hundred and forty-three thereof
and to follow section nineteen hundred and forty-two and to read as follows:
§ 1943. Procedure relating to resentencing. If at any time, either after
sentence or conviction, it shall appear that a person convicted of a felony
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that my observations are submitted. I venture to hope, however,
that it may not be without some value if an opinion is hazarded by
one whose training has been in another country having a jurispru-
dence of common origin to that obtaining in most of the United
States.
I cannot profess an exact knowledge of the very important field
of constitutional law or statutory construction which would neces-
sarily engage counsel in arguing a stated case on these sections before
an appellate tribunal. Nor do I propose to enter into any technical
argument or indulge in close reasoning regarding the refinements
of any specific case within the purview of these sections.
The popular conception of the Baumes Laws is really sufficient
for my purposes, as it illustrates the sociological questions involved.
From an academic ground my contention is, to put it succinctly,
that the intendment of the statute is not in harmony with ruling
principles of jurisprudence.
has previously been convicted of crimes as set forth either in section nineteen
hundred and forty-one or nineteen hundred and forty-two, it shall be the
duty of the district attorney of the county in which such conviction was
had to file an information accusing the said person of such previous convic-
tions. Whereupon, the court in which such conviction was had shall cause
the said person, whether confined in prison or otherwise, to be brought
before it and shall inform him of the allegations contained in such informa-
tion and of his right to be tried as to the truth thereof according to law, and
shall require such offender to say whether he is the same person as charged
in such information or not. If he says he is not the same person or refuses
to answer, or remains silent, his plea, or the fact of his silence, shall be
entered of record and a jury shall be empanelled to inquire whether the
offender is the same person mentioned in the several records as set forth in
such information. If the jury finds that he is the same person or if he
acknowledges or confesses in open court, after being duly cautioned as
to his rights, that he is the same person, the court shall sentence him to
the punishment prescribed in said sections nineteen hundred and forty-one
and nineteen hundred and forty-two, as the case may be, and shall vacate
the previous sentence, deducting from the new sentence all time actually
served on the sentence so vacated. Whenever it shall become known to
any warden or prison, probation, parole, or police officer or other peace
officer that any person charged with or convicted of a felony has been pre-
viously convicted within the meaning of said sections nineteen hundred and
forty-one, or nineteen hundred and forty-two, it shall become his duty
forthwith to report the facts to the district attorney of the county.
§ 4. This act shall take effect July first, nineteen hundred and twenty-six.
N. Y. Laws 1926, c. 705:
Section i. The penal law is hereby amended by adding thereto a new
section, to be known as section nineteen hundred and forty-four, and to read
as follows:
§ 1944. Committing felony while armed. If any person while in the act
of committing a felony, or attempting to commit a felony, shall be armed
with a pistol or any of the weapons or instruments specified in sections
eighteen hundred and ninety-seightighteen hundred and ninety-seven or
eighteen hundred and ninety-seven-a, the punishment elsewhere prescribed
in this law for the felony of which he is convicted shall be increased by
imprisonment in state's prison for not less than five nor more than ten
years. Upon a second conviction for a felony so committed such period
of imprisonment shall be increased by not less than tenyears nor more than
68 .
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With these angles of approach in mind, therefore, what I may term
a lay analysis of the text suggests a number of salient features for
consideration:
i. The caption of section 1943 is "Procedure relating to re-
sentencing," while the section is to be found in the Penal Law
and not in the Code of Criminal Procedure.
2. The theory of the sections is that "the defendant has not
reformed since his first offence, but has persisted in breaking the
law." A fourth conviction would seem to be the limitation
against possible reformation by the prescription of the life
penalty.
3. Prior convictions-within the meaning of the text-may be
matters of record in any other state, government or country.
4. No prior conviction as a previous offender or habitual
criminal per se is required to bring the accused within the opera-
tion of the text.
5. Upon mere proof of prior convictions, as a matter of record,
the accused-if convicted of a fourth offence--shall be sentenced
to life imprisonment, the question of identity only being ma-
terial.
6. Neither the court nor the district attorney has any discre-
tion regarding the punishment which is fixed by statute, not by
the court.7
fifteen years; and upon a third conviction for a felony so committed such
period of imprisonment shall be increased by not less than fifteen-nor more
than twenty-five years. Upon a fourth or subsequent conviction for a
felony so committed the person so convicted shall be imprisoned for life
or for a term not less than twenty-five years in the discretion of the court.
In no case shall any person punishable as above provided be put upon
probation or have the execution of his sentence suspended, notwithstanding
the provisions of section twenty-one hundred and eighty-eight, for the
increased term of his punishment imposed as above.
§ 2. This act shall take effect July first nineteen hundred and twenty-six.
See O'Malley, J., in People v. Kevlon, 221 A:pp. Div. 224, 227, 222 N. Y. Supp.
311, 313 (Ist Dept. 1927): "Section 1944 deals simply with the subject of increased
punishment for one who commits a crime in a certain manner. It does not purport
to define a crime. Section 2 (supra), on the other hand, defines who is a principal
in the commission of a crime. As an additional deterrent to crimes of violence
and the use of dangerous weapons in their commission... it was but logical that
the extra punishment provided should be visited only upon those in possession
of such dangerous weapons."
7Possibly it still remains an arguable question as to whether or not the court
has any discretion whatsoever in awarding the life penalty to fourth offenders.
The Appellate -Division of the New York Supreme Court has said that "Judicial
discretion in imposing punishment for crime has long been a recognized principle
of our criminal jurisprudence. In theory its exercise is quite unassailable. Such
discretion, however, is subject to abuse, and recent instances are not rare where
it has been improperly exercised. There comes a time when discretion should end,
and the Legislature, by the statute here under consideration, placed a fourth
conviction of a felony as beyond the pale of judicial discretion." See People v.
Gowasky, supra note 5, at 24, 219 N. Y. Supp. at 379. The last word on the
matter of discretion, however, has yet to be said.
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The result of this legislation is that if A commits four offences
amounting to felonies within the meaning of the Penal Law of the
State of New York, after conviction for the fourth offence, forthwith
and upon mere proof as a matter of record of three such prior con-
victions (the onus of which said proof shall be mandatory upon the
district attorney or other officer) the court, shorn of all discretion in
the matter, shall sentence such accused to imprisonment for the term
of his natural life; subject only, however, to a trial of the issue as to
identity in respect of prior convictions.
Having in mind that "the grade of an offence, that is whether
it is a felony or misdemeanor, is determined by the kind and extent
of the punishment which may be inflicted," 8  a further resolution
of the proposition may be made: The Legislature of the State of
New York, by sections 1942 and 1943 of the Penal Law, has seen fit
to require its courts to award the penalty of life imprisonment in
the cases of those who commit four offences (arbitrarily regarded as
felonies by the sovereign power of the state), without discretion to
the court to alter such penalty, and rendering it obligatory upon
officers of the court to produce existing evidence of such prior con-
victions-reserving to the accused only the right to a trial of the
issue as to identity.
Observe that the offence is a felony only if it has been so character-
ized by statute; that in giving effect to sections 1942 and 1943, the
court and its officers act only in a ministerial capacity, and not in a
judicial capacity; and that the life penalty remains fixed irrespective
of the aggregate penalties which might have been awarded severally
for each of the offences.
Has not the legislature in effect created a new offence consisting
of an accumulation of previous offences? For this "metaphysical
offence," the law fixes a penalty which shall be awarded willy-
nilly, not upon trial of the issue of such offence--for it can scarcely
be said to be founded in substantive law-but merely after sub-
mission of a record of prior offences by an officer of the court.
A CRITIQUE OF THE NEw YORK EXPERIMENT
Having briefly outlined the field of my discussion, let us examine
it in more detail under the headings of "crime," "the criminal,"
and "the penalty" respectively.
839 MCKINNEY, N. Y. CONS. LAWS (1909) 14, annotating § 2 of the Penal
Code.
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Crime
First, then, as to crime. "No external conduct, however serious or
even fatal its consequences may have been, is ever punished unless
it has been produced by some form or other of mens rea. It is not,
however, necessary that the offender should have intended to com-
mit the particular crime which he has committed; (indeed not even
that he should have intended to commit any crime at all). In all
ordinary crimes the psychological element which is thus indispen-
sable may be fairly accurately summed as consisting simply in
'intending to do what you know to be illegal' ".' While proof of
"mens rea" is essential to establish criminal liability at law, yet in
practice, the presumption of "mens rea" as imported by commission
of an offence (a presumption which may well be employed in proper
cases) is assuming a prominence which perhaps its most ardent
endorsers never anticipated. If, therefore, the substantive element
of mens rea can be established by reason of a presumption which can
be raised with little difficulty-that is, upon proof of the commission
of the offence--then, a natural sequence in criminal procedure is
the fixing of criminal liability as a ministerial act, without regard
to any theory of crime. That in effect is the result of the Baumes
Laws. The general application of this reasoning can only lead to
bureaucracy.
In the field of criminal law proper the intrusion of bureaucratic
doctrines and practice is abhorrent. 0 At the same time, it must
be recognized that there is a multiplicity of cases of minor infractions
of municipal statutes which, by reason of their number and fre-
quency, should be dealt with collectively. Proper economy in the
9KENNY, OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL LAW (6th ed. 1914) 39.
10See Brewer, J., dissenting in Budd v. New York, 143 U. S. 517, 550, 12 Sup,
Ct. 468, 478 (1891): ".... Men areendowed by their Creator with certain un-
alienable rights, 'life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness'; and to 'secure', not
grant or create, these rights governments are instituted. That property which a.
man has honestly acquired he retains full control of, subject to these limitations:
First, that he shall not use it to his neighbor's injury, and that does not mean
that he must use it for his neighbor's benefit...
"The paternal theory of government is to me odious. The utmost possible
liberty to the individual, and the fullest possible protection to him and his prop-
erty, is both the limitation and duty of government.
".... I believe the time is not distant when the evils resulting from this assump-
tion of a power on the part of government to determine the compensation a man
may receive for the use of his property, or the performance of his personal services,
will become so apparent that the courts will hasten to declare that government
can prescribe compensation only when it grants a special privilege, as in the crea-
tion of a corporation, or when the service which is rendered is a public service, or
the property is in fact devoted to a public use."
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administration of public affairs demands some such system. No
great wrong is done any one individual, and the balance of con-
venience is a benefit to the public at large. In such circumstances,
therefore, there can be no serious quarrel with the introduction of
even bureaucratic methods. But the iniquity of bureaucracy can
be seen when similar methods begin to find their way into our courts
of criminal jurisdiction, which have to deal with cases of sub-
stantive criminality where individual responsibility for criminal
conduct can be ascertained properly only by investigation along
accepted lines of procedure, so ordered as to protect to the utmost
the sanctity of the liberty of the subject.
So prodigious a mass of writing has appeared in the last few years
on "crime and insafiity" and "prevention of crime" and "what is
wrong with our criminal administration and criminal law?" and
kindred topics, that one must be very brave in venturing into the
field at all. I had hoped to be able to point to the position taken by
recognized authorities on at least some phases of the subject-to
illustrate the present-day attitude; but my researches have led me
to the conclusion that we are going through a period of transition.
There is little, if any, uniform scholarship to guide us. Without a
few constants held in tow by that sense of security which hovers
around the names of leading criminologists, psychiatrists, and jurists,
the novice is sailing not on uncharted seas, but on seas charted with a
hundred courses from which to choose whither chance leads him.
The only absolutely dominating demand of all writers on the subject
is that we must reexamine our whole system of criminal jurispru-
dence, our conception of crime and criminal liability and responsi-
bility, and our classifications thereof. From what starting point?
Well, from the starting point which happens to be the logical se-
quence of the particular premise adopted by any given commentator.
In current periodicals of a technical nature, which I have con-
sulted with considerable profit to myself, I have found many striking
statements and much data of an informative character, but I have
closed each volume in turn with an impression of vague uncertainty
as to what the author would have us do. His pages constitute, per-
haps, a philippic of considerable vitality against the present state
of affairs, but apart from suggestions along general lines-chiefly
consisting of the need for further scientific research-there is little
constructive material to aid us.
A statement of Dean Pound" which appeared recently gives
expression to the problem with his usual clarity:
11(1929) 42 HARV. L. REV. 297.
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Not the least interesting of present-day movements in juris-
prudence is the renewed quest for certainty after the reaction
from the formal certainty of nineteenth-century law. In the
last century we had looked at the general security from the
standpoint of security against the arbitrary action of magis-
trates and abuse of prosecuting machinery by officials, rather
than from the standpoint of security of society against the
conduct of offenders. In effect we had sought to put the social
interest in the individual life in terms of the general security.
It is the task of the criminal law to discover and mark out the
lines of a wise adjustment or practical compromise between the
general security and the individual life. In the humanitarian
thinking of the eighteenth century, stress was put upon the
individual life, and until recently that interest in effect had
preponderant recognition. The whole apparatus of criminal
justice was shaped by the quest for means of insuring an ab-
stractly uniform, outwardly mechanical administration. The
superseding of the common-law principle as to misdemeanors
by a doctrine of nulla poe','a sine lege, minutely defined degrees
of crime, and exact statutory penalties, worked out in detail
for minutely differentiated offenses, tied tribunals down rigidly
in appearance, while all sorts of mitigating devices parallel with
them and running through the whole course of the prosecution
tempered them in action.
Inevitably there was a reaction from the futile, cast-iron pre-
scribed penal treatment characteristic of the last century. A
movement for individualization on every side of the law took in
criminal justice the form of a development of individualized
penal treatment which was to make the penal treatment fit
the criminal rather than the punishment fit the crime. But
this movement for individualization and for preventive justice
has itself brought about a reaction. On the one hand it has
seemed to threaten the general security. Men have come to fear
that in our zeal to secure the individual life we may relax the
hold of society upon the anti-social, impair the fear of the
legal order as a deterrent upon anti-social conduct, and release
habitual offenders prematurely to resume their warfare upon
society. On the other hand, it has seemed to threaten the
security of the individual life by committing too much to the
discretion of administrative officers.
It is not difficult, then, to realize the pitfalls which beset the re-
former. Indeed, there is something to be said for that sort of over-
zealous person who urges us to secure new legislation which, if
tfnsatisfactory, can be amended. The only good, however, that can
be said of him is that he really wants to take some definite action.
His method, of course, is horrible in the extreme. Legislation-
expressing the sovereign will of the people-is fast becoming as
prolific and variable as journalistic editorials. No, much has to be
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done before the legislature is asked to enact further laws. Perhaps
much time might profitably be spent in abolishing a lot of dead wood
which has been cluttering up the books for years past. At any rate,
rash legislation is not the remedy.
Upon looking into the authorities available, it seems impossible
to reconcile the views of the dogmatic legal thinker, the empirical
medico-legal thinker, and the sociological thinker. Much of value
is to be drawn from each; but too often are they prejudiced in favour
of their own particular school of thinking, denying to other modes
of thought sufficient breadth of scope to deal with the matter.
Take, for example, the statement of the medical writer, "It will
rest with the judicial authority, or the jury, whether or not the
accused be dealt with as insane at court. This is, of course, of no
concern to the witness [the medical expert] who is not responsible,
as they are, for the protection of the public. 12
Such detachment is characteristic of the scientific man who
regards all matters submitted to him in the light of laboratory tests.
But the time has come when closer coordination among the learned
professions must be established in the creation of a politically respon-
sible class of trained persons who not only may be charged with the
protection of the public but also held responsible, within the measure
of their professional skill and the ambit of their public offices, for its
accomplishment.
Returning, then, to the examination of the prevailing conceptions
of crime, it will be seen that one lays himself open to the charge of
scholasticism when he enunciates a dogmatic definition of crime. I
quoted Dr. Kenny at the outset because his language is in keeping
with that which falls upon the ears of the unsuspecting law student
when first he is introduced to the subject of crime, and quite properly
so. The theory of mens rea is capable of a wider application than
any concise legal definition. It involves the element-describable
with infinite variety-essential to the determination of all criminal
liability, whether the accused be a person free from pronounced traces
of the various classes of insanity, whether he be a moron or a moral
imbecile or one suffering from moral insanity. Mens rea is, like the
"cogito ergo sum" of Descartes, a starting point in our reasoning
from which may be raised a workable superstructure. Let it be
conceded that mens rea is to-day an expression wider in meaning
than when it first came into use. It is a term of convenience, let us
say, to suggest all those multifarious tests by which in varying
degrees of criminal responsibility the accused may properly be
1EAST 1c. Cit. supra note 4.
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subjected to punishment-of some kind. Then let us read for the
word "punishment," "treatment."
Having in mind "the task of the criminal law to discover and mark
out the lines of a wise adjustment or practical compromise between
the general security and the individual life," the futility of any arbi-
trary classifications will be seen. Yet, it would be utterly impossible
to eliminate all standardization from our penal system. Offences
have to be described and offenders have to be dealt with, if law and
order are to be preserved. So the definition of an offence must be
fixed by law, as it is at present in every criminal code. Moreover, the
accused is entitled to know with what he is charged. But after con-
viction there should be instituted a searching inquiry as to the cause
which actuated him in committing the crime." Upon determination
of the cause, the convicted person can then be further dealt with as
the circumstances warrant. That he has committed a statutory
offence is certain; why he committed it is a matter for careful in-
vestigation, the findings from which will enable the proper authority
intelligently to deal with him. A crime, then, may be the subject of
statutory definition, while crime generically must be regarded as
something more than simply commission of the offences described
by statute. It involves a recognition of a condition inherent in the
individual, rendering the commission of the offence a necessary
result of that condition-if unrestrained or unhampered.
Appreciation of this dual nature of crime will strengthen the use-
fulness of accepted formulae in criminal jurisprudence. The negative
and positive sides of crime are "cause" and "result"; the subjective
and objective are "proclivity to commit" and "the actual commission
of" the offence. So that if the penal system provides for both the
subjective and objective nature of crime, each in its appropriate
13EAsT, op. cit. supra note 3, at 137: "The habitual criminal ... may have
had an even more prolonged career of crime. It does not, however, usually begin
in childhood, but about puberty, adolescence, or even later. Their criminal acts
tend to become specialized, the offender usually concentrates on attaining
proficience in one class of crime, and, moreover, contempt is often felt and ex-
pressed for crimes of a different character practised by others. Temptation
may be resisted although resistance ultimately fails; detection is avoided, if
possible by precautions; the risks run are not outrageously disproportionate to
the possible gains; and the profits obtained are enjoyed and not disregarded.
* * * * *
"The habitual criminal, at least at the commencement of his career, has some
conception of his social obligations to others, and some appreciation of right and
wrong. ... He may even give up his criminal practices if his surroundings be-
come favourable and free from temptation, unless the habit of crime has become
too firmly fixed."
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field, that is to say, if all crimes are adequately described and the
treatment of convicted persons is determined after due investigation
of the cause, the law will fulfil its function in providing both for
"the general security and the individual life. ", 14
The Criminal
The second matter for consideration is the criminal himself. If
terminology means anything, everyone who commits a crime is a
criminal. And I venture to suggest that, as a crime is a statutory
offence, he who commits one is a criminal, primarily within the
meaning of the statute only. His criminality is something imputed
to him ab extra, its real nature not being ascertainable without
proper investigation.
Something has been said on the subject of mens tea, as the essential
of every crime, but a criminal liability which arises from negligence
per se must not be overlooked. A negligent act or omission may result
in extremely serious consequences which in the awareness of the*
individual was not anticipated; while the initiate negligent act or
omission fixes on him the reasonable consequences of his negligence.
This doctrine, which forms an important part in our criminal law, is
founded on the presumption that a sane man intends the natural
consequences of his acts. In theory the only available rebuttal,
other things being equal, is remoteness of consequence.
How do we regard that class of individuals who are convicted of
offences arising out of negligence? As for example, the bank director
who signs a balance sheet which he has not read, or having read,
either does not understand or has no actuarial basis for belief in
its accuracy; the motorist who by reason of faulty brakes-which he
believed had been properly adjusted-runs down and kills a pedes-
trian; or, the mother who through ignorance of her child's condition,
fails to call in medical aid and suffers the child to die.
* These are not the ordinary anti-social acts. Yet they constitute
statutory criminal offences. In the instances cited, what, if any,
degree of moral turpitude is present? Public opinion is not highly
incensed against the accused in such cases, unless perhaps in that
of the bank director, by whose negligent act the last drama of in-
solvency is brought home to unfortunate depositors among whom
are always widows whose mite is lost, and orphans whose patrimony
is thrown into hotchpot for the general benefit of creditors.
John Galsworthy in his play Escape has given us a vivid study of
the normal reactions of "decent" people to the problem of lending
1USee Appendix, infra p. 8I.
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assistance to an escaped convict. A cultured young Englishman, who
held a commission during the war, is by mere chance brought into
conflict vith an officer of the law, occasioned by his resentment at
the officer's treatment of a young adventuress in arresting her in
Hyde Park for accosting. The young Englishman, simply on the spur
of the moment, gives expression to his innate sense of chivalry,
developed at Eton and Cambridge, and not stifled by his experiences
in the war. He protests against the rough handling of the woman,
and an altercation between him and the policeman ensues, in the
course of which the officer is knocked down and, hitting his head on
an iron railing, is killed. The young chap is arrested and sentenced
to four years at Dartmoor, from which he makes a phenomenal
escape shortly after his incarceration. The episodes of the play are
scenes with divers persons in various walks of life from whom he
seeks refuge in the course of his flight. The closing lines of the play,
somewhat abridged, read thus:
EPISODE X 15
In the vestry of a village church...
MATT. Well, Padre, how does it look to you? Giving me up?
PARSON. Padre! ... As man to man-who am I to give you up?
One poor fellow to another! ... I can't help you to escape, but if
you want rest, take it.
MATr. Wonder what Christ would have done!
PARSON. That, Captain Denant, is the hardest question in the
world. Nobody ever knows. You may answer this or that, but
nobody ever knows. The more you read those writings, the more
you realize that He was incalculable. You see--He was a genius!
It makes it hard for us who try to follow Him....
Did anyone see you come in here?
MATT. Can't have-they'd have been in on my heels.
PARSON. Who's after you?
MATT. Villagers-and a constable.
PARSON. My villagers-and here am I-
MATT. By George, yes, Padre! It's too bad. I'll clear out.
PARSON. No, No! Rest while you can. You've asked for sanctu-
ary. I don't know that I've the right to turn you out of here. I
don't know-anyway I can't....
(Enter the CONSTABLE, the FARMER, the Two LABOURERS and
the BELLRINGER.)
PARSON. What's all this, Constable?
15Part II.
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FARMER. Jest a minute, Vicar. Yu'll pardon me askin', but are yo
zartun zure as yu'n not zeen this joker?
PARSON. What is it you are asking me?
FARMER. I'm askin' yu on yure honour as a Christian gentleman,
whether or no yu've zeen the escaped convict?
PARSON. I-
MATT. [Stepping out from where he has been concealed.] Certainly
he's not. Sorry, Sir, I was hidden there. I surrender, Constable.
Forgive me, Sir! Oughtn't to have come in here. It wasn't playing
cricket.
PARSON. No, No! That you have done-that you have done.
MATT. Its one's decent self one can't escape.
PARSON. Ah! that's it! God keep you!
Is this a case of moral turpitude? I think most of us would
hesitate to say so. Galsworthy's notion is that the normal person
considers he is only "playing cricket" in giving the under-dog a sport-
ing chance. Yet, in so doing he may himself be committing a crime.
The worthy padre in doing what he did, had he lived in Canada,
would have committed an indictable offence under section 192 of
the Criminal Code!
Unquestionably, there are many breaches of law which emanate
from the best motives. Where such acts constitute offences against
the criminal law, the offender fupon conviction is regarded as a
criminal. But in our treatment of criminal responsibility, we cannot
ignore the human side.
On the other hand, there is that large number of persons who have
been described as "professional criminals" or "predatory outlaws."
The dockets, full as they are of the records of their trials, do not
begin to cover the number of cases which would exist if all such
offenders were apprehended. This class of offender comprises those
who conform to a type of habitual criminal possibly recognizable.
They are difficult to handle and probably merit severe treatment.
But, serious as is their warfare against society, they are a relatively
small class in the broad field of crime; and in making laws adequate
only to their requirement, in point of severity, without regard for
other kinds of offenders, is only to perfect the mechanics of punish-
ment and to close the door against possible reclamation.
The Penalty
It is impossible to speak at much length in these pages on the nature
of penalty.
I said at the commencement that my text was, "Let the punishment
fit the crime," and that such a maxim was a sound proposition in
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jurisprudence. If by "punishment" we mean "treatment," as I have
endeavoured to indicate, and if by "crime" we mean not only its
manifestation gauged by statutory definition, but also, and perhaps
chiefly, its essential nature as an inherent condition in the individ-
ual-then, and then only, can we succeed in finding "the lines of a
wise adjustment or practical compromise between the general
security and the individual life." If, on the other hand, "preven-
tive justice," so-called, seeks only the destruction of the wrong-
doer with no thought of his possible usefulness to the community
resulting from proper treatment in the first instance, then, in letting
the punishment fit the crime, it will be quite proper to devise all
manner of severities with which to annihilate the "decent self" of
the individual which may still remain. With the Mikado, we might
also decree that:
The billiard sharp whom anyone catches,
His doom's extremely hard
He's made to dwell
In a dungeon cell
On a spot that's always barr'd:
And there he plays extravagant matches
In fitless finger stalls
On a cloth untrue
With a twisted cue,
And elliptical billiard balls!
In the index to the Criminal Code of Canada, the term "habitual
criminal" does not appear. The distinction between felony and
misdemeanour (as known to the common law) is by section 14
abolished. Penalties have been provided in accordance with the
seriousness of the offences so far as it has been possible to assess
them. And while there is no degree of certainty that these penalties
are in the last anaylsis the appropriate ones, yet, in my view, the
absence of cumulative penalties for successive differentiated offences
in the Code, is not only not a deficiency, but is a factor contrib-
uting to practical coordination of the wrongdoer and the wrong-
doing in terms of the general welfare.
Aggravated crime in Canada is not rampant. Save only in the
very large centres are the criminal courts overtaxed with work. And
even then, it is surprising the celerity with which a man is brought
to trial after his arrest. Three things characterize the administra-
tion of criminal justice in Canada-speedy trial, conducted with the
utmost decorum; speedy removal to the place of incarceration upon
sentence after conviction; and sure infliction of penalties, just and
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adequate according to the lights of those whose duty it is to award
them.
It is abundantly clear to anyone familiar with criminal statistics
in the metropolitan areas, that the sequel of laxity in administration
is the increase of crimes of violence. To determine the adequacy of
any penal law it is imperative that its enforcement be certain. Alter-
ing a penal law without a knowledge of its efficacy under the best
type of administration is an error sometimes difficult to resist, but
to, secure the most ideal conditions we must not be content with
mere panaceas.
Our judicial officers appreciate only too well the difficulties of
the state's officers in protecting the public against the antisocial
members of the community. But they are bound by the law as it
stands on the statute books, and although they may in private advo-
cate abolition, amendment, or substitution, their judicial function
requires of them adherence to existing law.
The treatment of the offender after conviction is a problem requir-
ing the combined wisdom of those who are qualified to contribute to
the general knowledge. It is not too much to say that the state has
the right to expect them in a spirit of cooperation to lend their best
endeavours in the interests of preventive justice. The judiciary,
and the members of the bar for many, many years have borne this
high responsibility. Their keen.sense of ethics has gone far to cure
patent defects in the system of criminal administration. But the
time has now come when the lawyer, the medical man, and the law-
maker must combine their resources of knowledge and share equally
the responsibility of safeguarding the liberty of the subject in all its
ramifications.
In conclusion, may I say that in commending these random obser-
vations to the reader, I am fully aware of their limitations. The
subject is one of infinite difficulty and tremendous scope.
To compass a discussion of it in a few pages necessitates the aban-
donment of many important and complicated issues, which in the
present instance was done with reluctance. Much has been sacrificed
that special emphasis might be given to those phases of the problem
which in my view are of paramount consideration.
It is not possible intelligently to treat of crime as long as we are
fettered by procedure of a purely definitive character. And in solving
the momentous problem, let it not be forgotten that it is a human
problem, crying out for the protection of "life, liberty and the
pursuit of happiness."
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APPENDIX
Some Medical Studies of Persistent Criminality
KENNETH GiRyt
The first medical studies in criminology were those of the Italian,
Cesare Lombroso, in I87o. His efforts were of an anthropological
nature, consisting in the measurement of physical deviations of the
criminal from a normal or average type. The data and theories of
this scientist are not important, but his work has important value
in that, for the first time, investigation was centered on the criminal
himself.
Lombroso directed attention to the individual delinquent. Subse-
quent criminologists have commented on the primary importance
of his principle. Compare what Devon says-:6 "There is only one
principle in penology that is worth any consideration: it is to find
out why a man does wrong and make it not worth his while." White
says:17 "It is now proposed to discuss the growing tendency to a
consideration of the criminal as an individual. . ." and again, "the
principles of criminology dictate that the criminal and not the crime
should be the matter of prime consideration." See Healy:18 "Cer-
tainly the facts we have to show clearly indicate that from knowledge
of the springs of conduct in the offender we may hope a thousand
times more reasonably for a wise adjustment of his case than from
the application of artificial legal rules and punishments." Hoag
and Williams add: 9 ".. . the new method seeks to understand the
whole history of the individual, the factors of his heredity and
environment, and especially the early experiences of his childhood,
before any real solution of the problems of abnormal behavior is
attempted." K. Subrahmania Pillai says:" "The principle has been
established that the criminal rather than the crime should be the
object of investigation necessary for social defence on a right basis."
There is unanimity of opinion that the causation and adequate
treatment of crime are best studied in the individual delinquent.
What has been found about the motivation of criminal behavior?
Can one speak of a criminal type, in the sense of a specific deviation
from the normal, recognizable by defined criteria? Lombroso had
thought to find physical stigmata pathognomonic of the criminal, a
view not borne out by the facts. Later and contemporary studies
make clear that there is no such thing as a criminal type, in the sense
of an individual capable of description or having a common etiology.
Criminal behavior differs in no way from any other type of behavior,
in that its sources must be sought in a complex interweaving of
heredity and environment.
tResearch Fellow, Department of Medicine, University of Toronto.
'
6 HEALY, TEE INDIVIDUAL DELINQUENT (1927) title page.
ITWHITE, INSANITY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1923) 3o, 149.
'
1 HEALY, op. cit. supra note 16, at 8.
19HOAG AND WILLIAMS, CRIME, ABNORMAL MINDS AND THE LAW (1923) Introd.
at 17.20PILLAI, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY (1924) 110.
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The comments of White2 ' on this point are as follows: "... Is the
concept criminal definable in the sense that the individual who is
guilty of criminal conduct belongs to a sufficiently definite type to
permit of reasonably accurate description? The answer to this
question must obviously be a negative one. The whole concept of
crime has grown up from the point of view of the social group and
the criminal law undertakes only to define those acts which shall be
considered as criminal. Any one found guilty of those acts becomes
by definition a criminal. Stated in this way, it would seem quite
obvious from a survey of the multiplicity of criminal acts that it
would be impossible to reason from them to the nature of the person
committing them. There has, however, been a well defined belief
in the past which largely dominates the thoughts of the present,
that the criminal is a special type of individual capable of an accu-
rate description as a species, or a form of mental disease....
"While it is in general true that criminal conduct is relatively
more primitive in type, that statement does not necessarily disclose
anything of the type of individual who may have reacted in that
particular way at some particular time. An unprejudiced survey
of a group of criminals, all convicted of the same statutory offense,
will show quite the contrary. The immediate situation back of the
criminal act of stealing may in one case be poverty; in another a
kleptomaniacal obsession (neurosis); in another the disintegration
of the personality wrought by alcohol (alcoholism) or syphilis
(paresis); in another it may be the expression of a maniacal lack of
restraint (mania-depressive psychosis); in another the failure of
development of the social instincts (mental defectiveness); while
in another it may be due to lack of education and the influence of
- dominating and evilly disposed associates; conditions which are as
widely different as can easily be imagined but which all issue in an
act capable of the same statutory description. Someof theseindivid-
uals may be highly endowed, such as the neurotic, others funda-
mentally defective; in some the act may be the expression of a well-
defined personality make-up (the moron), while in others it is the
expression of a well defined mental disease (mania); in some the
disease may be chronic and incurable (paresis), in others essentially
transient and recoverable (mania); in some, treatment may remove
the difficulty (the neuroses), in others, treatment may be of no avail
(paresis). All of these conditions, therefore, and not only mental
defectiveness, are of a nature to make difficult or impossible
those reactions demanded by a highly complex society and, therefore,
tend to unloose simpler ways of reacting which may be criminal.
The possibilities are infinite but as they unfold, the definiteness of
the conventional and formal concept of the criminal recedes further
and further into the background until finally it is no longer in the
field of vision at all.
"From the psychiatric point of view, therefore, the criminal as
such has ceased to exist and in his place are the individual offenders of
the criminal law...."
21WHITE, op. cit. supra note 17, at 23-26.
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Agreement is found in Hoag and Williams:- "For purposes of
convenience in studying the individual delinquent we may establish
groups or types, but in an exact sense there is no true criminal or
delinquent type."
From what has been said of the complexity of the causes of crimi-
nal actions, it follows that the term, habitual criminal, will include
a variety of offenders, whose antisocial behavior is the outcome of a
diversity of motivation. Healy" discriminates two classes of habitual
offenders: the professional, and the non-professional. His criteria
of professionalism are: their criminalism is deliberate, premeditated
and repeated. Several factors in the genetics of recidivism are
uncovered. Certain innate personal characteristics as motor dexter-
ity, smallness of size, abnormal social suggestibility, and many
others are suggested. Many economic and environmental factors,
including neglect, poverty, lack of opportunity, criminalistic teach-
ings play a part. The factor of deliberate choice is considered: the
opportunities for learning the arts of criminalism are sometimes
sought out by the individual, rather than thrust upon him.
The term, habitual criminal, does not imply one of a group charac-
terized by consistent motivation. Study of the individual case is
essential to treatment, and is the only method of estimating the
outcome.
22HOAG AND WILLIAMS, op. cit. supra note x9, Introd. at 19.
2HEALY, op. cit. supra note I6,c. 8, passim.
